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In this paper, we examine the gender specific impact of discriminatory taxation on fairness perception 
and individual labor supply decisions. Using the controlled environment of an experimental laboratory, 
we manipulate both distributional as well as procedural justice of taxation between subjects. We violate 
distributional fairness through the random application of tax rates, while procedural justice is broken 
by levying discriminatory tax rates based on taxpayer gender. For both inequality in outcome as well 
as discrimination, we find strong differences in reactions between male and female participants. Male 
participants perceived gender discriminatory taxation as unfair in and of itself. Female participants 
perceived random taxation as well as gender discriminatory taxation to be unfair, as long as they ended 
up with the higher tax rate. The perceived fairness strongly drove (did not affect) male (female) 
participants’ labor supply. Taken both subgroups together, while mere outcome inequality did not 
influence labor supply decisions significantly, we find evidence of a negative effect of gender-based 
discrimination on labor supply.  
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The call for equality is as old as human rights themselves. Nevertheless, it took until the past century 
for gender equality to become one of the major political concerns in western industrialized countries. 
Over the past decades, gender issues with respect to the labor market form the heart of this discussion. 
European politicians have recently put gender differences in taxation into the spotlight (Gunnarsson et 
al., 2017). Among other factors, a variety of tax policies in practice such as joint taxation for couples, 
Earned Income Tax Credits or Working Tax Credits are accused to establish inequalities and to 
promote disincentives for labor market participation of secondary earners and therefore mostly women 
(e.g. Blundell, 2000; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Gunnarsson et al., 2017). In the course of this discussion, 
Alesina and Ichino (2007) promoted the idea of gender-based taxation, implementing lower tax rates 
for women while raising tax rates for men. This idea – while not yet empirically evaluated - also found 
its way into tax reform suggestions in Italy (Alesina et al., 2011). 
Evidence on work incentives for secondary earners, often based on survey data, is growing (recent 
studies for Germany are for example Triebe, 2013; Chirvi, 2019). While a growing number of 
socioeconomic factors, such as the division of unpaid work, enter the discussion on gender-based 
inequalities in taxation (see e.g. Gunnarsson et al., 2017; Schröder and Burow, 2016; Cochard et al, 
2018), research regarding perceptional effects of inequalities is lacking. Despite the common 
conclusion that individuals respond to perceived unfairness in the labor market (for a recent overview 
see Fehr et al., 2009), so far no empirical study addresses fairness perceptions of inequalities in taxation 
and the potential fairness effects on labor supply. Given the political relevance and the vast discussion 
of labor supply responses to tax policies in general (see Killingsworth, 1983, part 6; Keane, 2011), the 
lack of empirical evidence with respect to the perception and effects of inequality in taxation is 
astonishing. 
We directly investigate the causal link from unfair tax settings across workers via perceived fairness 
(mediator) to the individual labor supply decision. We address the questions whether market 
participants actually perceive taxation fairness differently and adjust their labor supply accordingly. 
To test the proposed causal relations, we conduct a between subjects laboratory experiment. Our 
analysis differentiates between the distinct domains of tax fairness - distribution and procedure - and 
captures discrepancies in perceptions and reactions between subjects. Differences in distributional 
fairness are created by randomly attributing either high or low tax rates to subjects, while the 
randomization is completely visible to the participants. Gender-based tax rates are levied to introduce 
a violation of procedural justice. Hereby our experimental design is set up in order to capture both a 
situation in which female participants suffer from inequality by facing a high tax rate, as well as a 
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situation in which female participants benefit from facing a low tax rate. Male participants face the 
corresponding low (high) tax rate in each situation.  
The experimental results reveal strong differences with respect to gender. Male participants perceive 
violations of procedural justice (gender-based tax rates) as unfair, regardless of their resulting financial 
incentive. In addition, the perceived fairness of the tax system has a positive effect on labor supply by 
male subjects. On the other hand, fairness perceptions by female participants are driven by their 
personal outcome. Female subjects in our sample strongly decrease fairness ratings when personally 
facing a high tax rate. Yet, labor supply by female participants is not affected by fairness.  
Our study contributes to the research on taxes and labor supply by being the first to investigate the 
impact of unfair differential taxation between subjects on individual labor supply in a laboratory 
experiment. Thereby we pioneer in the analysis of the effects of random and discriminatory inequity 
in taxation. Using gender as the basis of discrimination, we directly address relevant gender issues of 
taxation. In addition, we contribute to the literature on comparative net pay among workers, by 
introducing net pay differences through unequal tax rates. We thus provide further evidence on the 
effects of comparisons between workers on individual preferences and decisions by investigating the 
influence of discriminatory (net) wage differences on labor supply in the lab.  Finally, by distinctively 
manipulating the tax rate determination procedure, we contribute to the broader research field on trust 
in authorities and its effects on individual decision-making.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 2, a brief review of the related literature 
and its implications for the current study is presented. In section 3, we derive the hypothesis and 
describe the experimental design. Results from the empirical analysis are stated and discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 closes with final remarks.  
2. Review of the related literature 
Violations of fairness: Conceptual framework 
Building on research from social psychology, Wenzel (2003) constructs a conceptual framework of 
fairness perceptions with respect to taxation. Within the framework, three norms of justice are 
differentiated: a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice and c) retributive justice. Distributive justice 
refers to the allocation of the tax burden, the outcome of the allocation process. Procedural justice 
refers to the means and methods of the allocation process itself. At last retributive justice refers to the 
treatment and control of norm violations (Wenzel, 2003; Kirchler et al., 2008). As sanctions of norm 
violations lie outside the scope of our investigation, in the remainder of this article we will focus on 
pillars a) and b) of this framework.  
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In the course of the debate on tax compliance, several characteristics of the tax system have been 
established by prior literature to enhance perceived fairness. Hereby, each of the three norms of justice 
is evaluated on an individual, group and societal level.1 In our experimental approach we focus on 
manipulating distributive justice on the individual level. Building on Adams (1965) prevalent model 
of inequity in social exchange, the tax literature has adopted the idea that distributive justice on the 
individual level is achieved if a taxpayer is treated in relation to his personal attributes (merits, effort 
and needs). Therefore, equality has to be established among comparable individuals (Wenzel, 2003; 
Kirchler et al., 2008). In our experimental design, we violate this equality norm by visibly levying 
taxpayer specific tax rates on identical pre-tax piece rates. Procedural justice on the group level is 
evaluated according to the neutrality of the way different subgroups of individuals are treated by the 
tax authority. Example criteria are whether one group carries a greater burden than another or an 
individual is treated disrespectfully based on his/her affiliation to a specific group (Wenzel, 2003; 
Kirchler et al., 2008). While we manipulate distributive justice on the individual level, we violate 
procedural justice on the group level by introducing gender-based tax rates. 
Perception of fairness: Gender differences 
By violating procedural justice either through the discrimination of the male or the female 
experimental subpopulation, differences in the respective reactions of the two groups are analyzed. 
Gender differences in fairness perceptions as well as distributional preferences have long been 
suggested in the literature. Especially gender differences in preferences related to labor market 
behavior, such as risk taking or social preferences, have been widely discussed and supported by 
experimental studies (for a recent overview see Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). Additionally, Pfeifer 
and Stephan (2018) provide evidence of gender differences in wage fairness perceptions, where 
women are more willing to regard their wages as fair and subsequently less likely to demand pay raises. 
Early theories on differences between male and female justice perception suggest that men apply an 
absolute concept of justice, while female justice perception is more relative (Gilligan, 1982). This idea 
has found empirical support in economic settings, as women appear to be more sensitive to the decision 
making context and to have a higher likelihood of switching between fairness principles (Eckel and 
Grossmann, 1996; Miller and Ubeda, 2012). However, results regarding gender as a moderator of 
justice effects in varying employment contexts remain inconclusive (for an overview see Dulebohn et 
al., 2016). Furthermore, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) do not find a strong relation between 
gender and justice perception in their meta-analysis of studies regarding the role of justice in 
                                                 
1  In the following we will limit the discussion on the levels relevant to this research. For further information please refer 
to e.g. Wenzel (2003) or Kirchler et al. (2008).  
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organizations. In order to directly measure gender specific reactions towards violations of procedural 
and distributive justice, Dulebohn et al. (2016) record brain activity during decisions in ultimatum 
games using functional MRI. They report stronger reactions in brain activity for female participants 
with respect to both procedural as well as distributive justice (Dulebohn et al, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
identified differences in activation level do not always translate into differences in actions (Dulebohn 
et al, 2016). Given the ongoing debate on gender differences in labor market reactions, we assured that 
each experimental treatment group consists of approximately the same number of male and female 
participants. We did so because we aim at studying the overall market impact of inequalities and 
accordingly fairness violations of taxation. This design enables us to derive conclusions regarding 
society as a whole while keeping the relevant gender focus.  
Reactions to fairness: Distributive justice and labor supply 
We now turn to the literature on how distributive justice affects labor supply. Despite the widely 
acknowledged importance of tax system fairness, only one empirical study addresses the effects of 
perceived unfairness of taxation on labor supply, but with a simplified measure of distributive justice. 
Using data from the 2005 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), Cornelißen et al. (2013) 
show that the belief that “the rich do not pay their fair share in taxes” is associated with a 20% increase 
in paid absenteeism from work. While the study proposes a link between tax fairness beliefs and 
individual labor supply, it is exposed to several shortcomings. Claiming a causal relationship between 
the two phenomena based on the given data is inherently difficult. Furthermore, despite comprehensive 
modelling, measurement issues regarding the difference between absenteeism due to actual sickness 
and deliberate reductions in working time as a response to fairness concerns remain. 
While existing studies on the effect of taxes on labor supply do not offer evidence regarding 
comparisons among taxpayers, there is a growing stream of literature concerning the effects of relative 
pay information on worker behavior. Most studies report findings of (positive and negative) reciprocal 
behavior in labor effort (e.g. Cohn et al., 2015; Cohn et al., 2014; Fischer and Steiger, 2009; Charness 
and Kuhn, 2007). However, following Bracha et al. (2015) reciprocity should not determine labor 
supply decisions as only the employee benefits from accepting, rejecting or renegotiating a given job 
offer. Using data from a laboratory experiment, they provide evidence of a strong negative effect of 
relative pay information on the labor supply of comparatively low paid workers (Bracha et al., 2015). 
Arguably, this result indicates a shift in workers preferences potentially in line with “coherent 
arbitrariness” (Bracha et al., 2015). In addition to experimental evidence, results by Cornelißen et al. 
(2011) indicate a negative impact of perceived unfairness of CEO pay on working morale based on 
data from the 2005 SOEP wave. Card et al. (2012) provide further evidence in this direction by 
5 
 
reporting lower job satisfaction and higher probability of looking for a new job among relatively low 
paid university staff members with access to co-worker pay information. 
Reactions to fairness: Procedural justice and labor supply 
Results on the role of intentions in tax settings emphasize the importance of tax rate determination 
procedures. Lévy-Garboua et al. (2009) provide evidence that the existence of Laffer curve effects in 
labor supply is highly dependent on the existence of a tax rate intentionally chosen by a market partner. 
While randomly applied tax rates rather lead to a linear decline in labor supply, intentionally set tax 
rates lead to stronger labor supply reductions at the highest possible tax rate in the experiment (79%) 
and show a non-linear effect on labor supply below that (Lévy-Garboua et al., 2009). Therefore, our 
experimental design isolates procedural justice by varying the actual tax rate determination process 
from universal to random to discriminatory. The argument underlying these results is that the 
perception of being treated unfairly and thus reducing labor supply as an emotional response is highly 
dependent on the manner in which tax rates are chosen (Lévy-Garboua et al., 2009). Evidence from 
ultimatum games further supports the role of intentions when it comes to human interactions. Falk et 
al. (2003), for example, show that the probability of rejecting an uneven (unfair) offer, and thus 
forgoing own income, significantly increases when the offer is made intentionally compared to a 
randomly decided split. In a labor market context, these results have been confirmed with regard to the 
effect of wage offers on exerted effort (e.g. Charness, 2004, Offerman, 2002). Therefore, our 
experimental design isolates procedural justice by varying the actual tax rate determination process 
from universal to random to discriminatory. 
Reactions to fairness: Gender differences  
Possible differences between genders in their reaction towards perceived justice in the workplace have 
long been discussed in organizational theory. Regarding the role of distributive justice, early results 
by Lee and Farh (1999) show that women place more emphasis on distributive justice when deciding 
on how much they trust their supervisor. However, gender did not affect the relation between 
distributive nor procedural justice on either pay satisfaction or commitment according to their results 
(Lee and Farh, 1999). Other studies provide evidence of females reporting higher commitment than 
men for any given level of distributive justice (Ramamoorthy and Flood, 2004) or stronger decreases 
in commitment by female workers in response to perceived gender discrimination (Foley et al., 2005). 
Some studies also conclude that female employees show stronger effects in commitment and intentions 
to stay in response to perceived procedural justice (Sweeney and McFarlin, 1997; Silva and Caetano, 
2014; Hon, 2011).  On the other hand, further results provide evidence of greater effects of distributive 
justice on satisfaction at work and the intention to stay of male employees (Sweeney and McFarlin, 
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1997, Foley et al., 2005). While Fields et al. (2000) find no gender differences in the relation between 
distributive or procedural justice perception and organizational outcomes such as the intention to stay, 
job satisfaction or supervisor evaluation in their study of Hong Kong employees.   
Finally, studies regarding the effects of gender-based taxation mainly agree that taxing women at a 
lower rate than men is effectively in raising women’s overall labor supply and can be optimal (e.g. 
Alesina et al., 2011; Colombino and Narazani, 2018; Colonna and Marcassa, 2015). However, results 
by Meier and Rainer (2015) suggest that the optimal allocation of a low tax rate to a gender, male or 
female, strongly depends on the underlying assumptions. While assumptions usually include differing 
labor supply elasticities between men and women, potentially differing fairness perceptions are 
neglected so far. However, a significant fraction of taxpayers may perceive gender-based taxation as 
a violation of both distributive and procedural justice within the tax system.  
While the importance of justice in designing tax policies cannot be denied, empirical research 
regarding the link between the perception of this justice and labor outcomes is lacking. By evaluating 
the effects of sequential violations of a tax system’s distributive and procedural justice on fairness 
perceptions and its translation into labor supply decisions, our aim is to help to close this gap. 
3. Hypothesis Development and Experimental Design 
3.1. Hypothesis Development 
Regarding the effects of violations of distributive and procedural justice, we first want to analyze the 
fairness perception of disadvantageously taxed subjects. Building on the definition of distributive 
justice established in the tax compliance literature (please refer to section 2), subjects randomly taxed 
at a high rate are expected to perceive their personal tax burden as being too high relative to others and 
thus unfair. In comparison subjects universally taxed at a high rate might still perceive a 40% tax rate 
as being too high in absolute terms, but they cannot perceive a violation of equality between themselves 
and others. Hypothesis 1a therefore states:  
H 1a: Violations of distributive justice in taxation reduce perceived fairness of the tax system for 
disadvantaged subjects. 
Combining this negative effect of violating distributive justice towards the individuals disadvantage 
with the presented evidence on the importance of procedural justice of the tax system, we expect 
subjects that are being discriminated by the tax system to further reduce their fairness perception of 
the tax system. Hypothesis 1b therefore states: 
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H 1b: Additional violations of procedural justice in taxation result in further reductions of perceived 
fairness of the tax system by disadvantageously taxed subjects.  
Concerning the fairness perception of those participants that are knowingly taxed at a relatively low 
rate, we would expect them to perceive their own tax burden as being (too) low as compared to others. 
A phenomenon not yet discussed in terms of tax system justice evaluation. Following the predictions 
in Adams’ (1965) general model on equality, the perception of an unequal outcome should lead to an 
adjustment in behavior for both advantageously and disadvantageously treated individuals in order to 
restore equality and fairness in the workplace. According to the model, we would thus predict a 
reduction in fairness ratings for advantageously taxed subjects as compared to a universally applied 
low tax rate. However, regarding the effect of advantageous treatments on preferences, Loewenstein 
et al. (1989) provide evidence that people care about both disadvantageous as well advantageous 
inequality but to a different extent. According to their results, the decline in utility following 
advantageous inequality is weaker as compared to disadvantageous utility. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
incorporate these findings into their utility model and conclude that the resulting utility function fits 
results in various types of experimental gamers such as ultimatum or market competition. Accordingly, 
we would expect the decline in fairness perception of advantageously treated subjects to be 
significantly less pronounced. Additionally, prior evidence on inequality in pay (see section 2) supports 
a positive fairness effect in the behavior of advantageously treated individuals. For example, 
participants in an experiment by Blount and Bazerman (1996), show a higher willingness to work 
under better but unequal pay conditions than marginally lower but equal pay. Based on this evidence 
we would expect subjects that are randomly taxed at a low rate to experience a feeling of “getting 
lucky” and thus potentially even increasing fairness ratings. In the tax context, results by e.g. Spicer 
and Becker (1980) show that advantageously treated individuals evade less income tax are in line with 
equality restoring behavioral reactions, they contradict the general notion of inequality being perceived 
as unfair, which should result in increasing tax evasion. In conclusion both a positive as well as a 
negative effect of advantageous inequality on fairness perception is possible. While additional 
violations of procedural justice, especially through discrimination, are likely to mitigate the positive 
effect, it is impossible to assess the relative strength of this mitigation. Accordingly, we formulate 
Hypothesis 1c undirected.   
H 1c: Violations of distributive and procedural justice in taxation do not change perceived fairness for 
advantageously taxed subjects.  
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Based on widely discussed gender differences in justice evaluations within organizations, we expect 
female and male fairness perceptions to differ with respect to violations of distributive and procedural 
justice. Prior evidence by Pfeifer and Stephan (2018) regarding wage evaluations also supports 
differences in wage fairness perception by gender. However, prior evidence from organizational theory 
are is not conclusive and direct evidence regarding gender differences in fairness perception with 
respect to tax system characteristics is missing. Therefore, we formulate Hypothesis 1d negatively: 
H 1d: Fairness perceptions regarding violations of distributive and procedural justice in taxation do 
not differ by gender.  
Following the previously discussed evidence on the importance of fairness concerns in the labor 
market (see section 2), we expect all participants to decrease labor supply with decreasing fairness. 
Hypothesis 2a regarding the overall effect of fairness perception on labor supply thus states: 
H 2a: Perceived fairness affects labor supply positively. 
Based on the broad evidence on differing reactions towards perceived fairness as well as differing 
labor market behavior of men and women (see section 2 as well as Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014 for a 
recent overview), we are further interested in potential differences in labor supply with respect to tax 
fairness perceptions between these two groups. As we cannot assume a clear direction of potential 
differences in the positive effect of fairness by male and female participants, we again formulate 
Hypothesis 2b regarding gender differences negatively. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2b states: 
H 2b: Perceived fairness effects on labor supply do not differ between male and female participants.  
3.2. Experimental Design 
We examine the effects of violations of distributive and procedural justice in taxation using a 2 × 3 
between subjects factorial design. Treatment variations constitute of the level of the applied tax rate 
(low or high) and the determination procedure of the individually applied tax rate (universal, random 
or discriminatory). An overview of the general sequence of the experiment is shown in Figure 1 
(below). Please note that Figure 1 separates treatment groups by the actual treatment information 
provided during the experiment. Figure 2 below shows the actually resulting six treatment groups used 
in the empirical evaluation.  
The first two groups, namely Control Low and Control High, form the reference groups for the 
treatment groups Random and Discriminatory. The groups Control Low and Control High represent 
the case of a universally applied tax rate with no direct fairness violation. Participants assigned to these 
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groups do not receive any information about any other group. In the Control Low (Control High) 
treatment, subjects are solely informed that the general tax rate equals 20% (40%).  
Our first treatment groups (Random), consisting of the two groups Random Low and Random High, 
are designed to manipulate distributive justice on the individual level. By introducing inequity through 
differing tax rates on the same pre-tax piece rate we hereby violate distributive justice among 
equivalent and comparable tax payers (horizontal equity). Furthermore, due to the highly transparent 
random application of tax rates we do not violate procedural justice at this point. In the Random 
treatments subjects are informed that the individually applied tax rate equals either 20% (Random Low) 
or 40% (Random High) depending on the color of a table tennis ball (orange for low and white for 
high) drawn before the start of the actual experiment. Accordingly, subjects in both treatments knew 
that there were other subjects in the room randomly taxed at a different rate. 
In our other treatment groups (Discriminatory), we did not only manipulate distributive but also 
procedural justice as compared to the Random treatment group. Due to the ongoing debate on existing 
gender inequalities, we decided to levy gender-based taxes as a violation of procedural justice. For 
subjects in the last two treatment groups, Discriminatory High and Discriminatory Low, the 
individually applied tax rate was determined based on their gender. In order to gain gender robust 
treatment results for the last groups the treatment information for Discriminatory High and 
Discriminatory Low was further divided. For half of the subjects in the groups the discrimination 
resulted in a high tax rate for men, while for the other half it resulted in a high tax rate for women; and 
the participants only knew about the discrimination in their subgroup. As a result, the treatment groups 
Discriminatory High and Discriminatory Low consist equally of men and women, whereby both feel 
either disadvantageously or advantageously discriminated respectively. 
In order to identify the effects of discriminatory taxes on perceived fairness and labor supply, we 
conducted a real effort experiment using a contract approach. The contract approach allowed all 
subjects to decide on the number of tasks they were willing to work on, and accordingly the time they 
were willing to work for, given the specific contract conditions (Blaufus et al., 2016). By individually 
determining the duration of the experiment, subjects were given the choice between labor (translating 
into income available for consumption) and actual leisure time. For the real effort task, we used a 
modified version of the digit-counting task introduced by Abeler et al. (2011). The task involved 
counting the number of ones in a 10 × 10 digit table randomly filled with a 50% chance per cell of 
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containing either a zero or one.2 The tables were generated at the beginning of each session and did 
not vary by treatment. One female and one male experimenter supervised all sessions. Each session 
consisted of one overall period that was divided into seven subsequent stages. Figure 1 provides and 
overview of these stages. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). All experimental treatments were randomly applied in all session, thus possible effects of time 
and day were not treatment specific. Using random assignments we ensured an approximately equal 
distribution of male and female participants per treatment. The probability of being taxed at a high 
(low) rate equaled 50% for all participants, while the probability of each treatment assignment equaled 
16.67% for all participants throughout all sessions. 
                                                 
2  The counting task has several advantages. First, it does not require any prior knowledge and previous experiments by 
Abeler et al. (2011) and Bühren and Kundt (2014) do not show significant learning effects throughout the task. Being 
boring, artificial and purposeless it also introduces costs of effort for the subjects while ruling out experimenter demand 




Figure 1. Experimental Procedure (Bold lines display information separation between subjects) 
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Before entering a labor contract, all subjects had the chance to familiarize themselves with the real 
effort task through an unpaid training period. The training period consisted of a maximum of five 
subsequent tables. During the training period, subjects were shown a countdown per table to enhance 
individual working time estimates. Furthermore, the training period offers the opportunity to control 
for possible, however unlikely, differences in individual talent for the task.  
At stage four, the actual treatment information was given to the subjects.3 Throughout all stages of the 
experiment, all instructions were provided electronically and questions could be posted towards the 
experimenters quietly at all times.4 Treatment instructions consisted of the information on the 
treatment dependent tax system as well as the pre-tax piece rate and the general labor contract 
conditions. The pre-tax piece rate per correctly counted table equaled 15 Euro Cents for all subjects. 
In addition, all subjects were informed that all tax payments due were donated by the experimenter to 
the library of the School of Business & Economics of the Freie Universität Berlin. The donation of tax 
payments to the school’s library was made in order to replicate the purpose of state tax systems to 
finance public goods while keeping the actual public good at a decent level of abstraction.  
At this point, each subject could enter a labor contract on a self-chosen number of tasks (tables) to 
work on. The number of tables agreed upon in the contract referred to the total number of tables the 
individual subject had to count, not the number of correctly counted tables. Therefore, subjects were 
able to make mistakes during the subsequent working period. This provides the additional possibility 
to compare not only labor supply across treatments but also working effort.5  
3.3. Variable Measurement 
Our main dependent factor of interest is labor supply. 6 Labor supply is defined as the number of tables 
each subject agreed upon in his labor contract. Every participant could enter a contract in a range 
between zero and a maximum of 200 tables. The limitation of tables was chosen in order to keep the 
duration of the experiment at a maximum of four hours while preventing corner solutions at the 
maximum number of tables.  
                                                 
3  A translation of the treatment instructions is provided in Appendix 1. 
4  During the experiment, instructions all were given in German. A translation of the treatment instructions is provided in 
Appendix 1. The full original instructions as well as translations of the general instructions, task explanations and 
questionnaires can be requested from the authors.  
5  As the focus of this paper lies on labor supply reactions, we do not include the analyses of working effort in the current 
version. The respective results will be included in future versions of this paper. 
6  An overview of the main variables of interest and their description is provided in Appendix 2. For a complete overview 
of all variables, please refer to the Online Appendix.  
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Drawing on Tan and Chin-Fatt (2000) we further monitored fairness perception during the experiment 
a) regarding the general tax system and b) the individual personal tax experience. In addition, subjects 
had to rate procedural fairness and equality of the tax system applied during the experiment. Fairness 
Perceptions were collected via four statements each measured on a Likert-type 1-to-7-scale, ranging 
from “I do not agree at all” to “I fully agree”. 
Regarding important control variables, participants had to state their initial motivation to earn money 
during the experiment as well as their change in that motivation due to the treatment information. In 
the post-experimental questionnaire we further measure individual inequity aversion (fairness 
preferences). Following Bazart and Bonein (2014), we used the payout distribution task, developed by 
Bartling et al (2009), to capture aheadness and behindness aversion in a situation where the participant 
him- and herself is subject to the consequences of his/her decision.7  
3.4. Sample Characteristics 
The experiment was conducted in 15 sessions at the computerized experimental laboratory of the Freie 
Universität Berlin School of Business and Economics during June, November and December 2017. 
Overall, 179 undergraduate and graduate students from the Freie Universität Berlin participated in the 
experiment. No student participated in more than one session. All participants were recruited via public 
announcements using identical invitations. On average seven female and six male students participated 
in each session. Subjects earned 10.50 € on average for an average duration of 82 minutes. Table 1 
provides an overview of the sample characteristics.8 
Table 1. Participant characteristics  
      
 N Mean Sd Min Max 
Gender 179 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Talent 179 -55.07 27.79 -220.74 0 
Age 179 21.79 4.29 17 52 
Business & Economics 179 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Semester 179 3.77 3.83 1 25 
Time Pressure 179 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Disposable Income 179 395.04 259.97 0 1600 
Observations 179     
                                                 
7  The task was included as hypothetical questions so neither of tasks led to any payment for the participants.  
8  An overview of further sample characteristics regarding potential influential factors such as preferences for equality is 




4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1. Treatment Effects on Fairness Perceptions 
 
Figure 3. Fairness ratings by relative outcome 
Regarding the treatment effects on fairness perception (Hypothesis 1a to 1d), we first have a combined 
look at the effect dependent on whether subjects end up being advantageously taxed as compared to 
being disadvantageously taxed. In order to get a clear picture of reactions to both sides of inequality, 
benefit (low tax rate) and suffering (high tax rate), by all, male, and female participants, we combine 
the results for treatments Random High and Discrimination High into Disadvantageous Tax and those 
of Random Low and Discrimination Low into Preferential Tax and compare fairness perceptions 
between those. Differences between treatment groups are based on results from Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Tests.9 We find a significant increase in fairness ratings with respect to General Fairness and a highly 
significant increase with respect to Personal Fairness of all participants (Figure 3, left side). Procedural 
Fairness ratings by all participants do not differ dependent on their personal outcome.  
                                                 
9  Please note that we do not adjust p-values for multiple hypothesis testing as we cannot find an economic reason why 





















































However, looking at fairness perceptions by male and female participants separately, we find 
surprisingly differing results (Figure 3, middle and right side). We only find evidence of a marginally 
significant increase in Personal Fairness ratings by male participants when comparing a preferential to 
a disadvantageous outcome. Ratings of General and Procedural Fairness by male participants do not 
differ based on a preferential outcome. Fairness ratings by female participants, however, strongly 
increase in the case of preferential taxation. This effect is largest for the rating of Personal Fairness, 
considering how they themselves have been treated, but also highly significant in the rating of General 
Fairness and significant regarding the fairness of the procedure applied to determine the tax rate.  These 
findings based on descriptive statistics indicate the existence of a strong difference in fairness 
perception between male and female participants with respect to inequalities (Hypothesis 1d).  
 
Figure 4. Difference in Fairness Perception in contrast to unitary taxation 
To clarify the suggested relation between violations of distributive and procedural justice (Hypothesis 
1a to 1d), we combine all four fairness categories (General Fairness, Personal Fairness, Procedural 
Fairness and Equality) into one variable: Fairness Perception. We do so by calculating a simple mean 
of the four individual ratings. Results for all, male, and female participants, are shown in Figure 4. 
Pairwise comparison of Fairness Perception by treatments dependent on whether the outcome for the 
individual was a high or a low tax burden, support our hypothesized effects. With respect to Fairness 



















































disadvantageously taxed subjects following violations of distributive and procedural justice. Fairness 
Perception decreases significantly when comparing Random High to Control High as well as 
Discriminatory High to Random High (Hypothesis 1a and 1b). With respect to advantageously taxed 
subjects, we can reject Hypothesis 1c of no difference in Fairness Perception following random or 
discriminatory advantages. Taken together, our results support a weak decrease in fairness evaluations 
when violations of distributive justice result in advantages, and a strong decrease in fairness 
evaluations following violations of procedural justice. We find a marginally significant decrease in 
Fairness Perception when comparing treatment groups Random Low and Control Low, a significant 
decrease in Fairness Perception when comparing Discriminatory Low to Random Low and a highly 
significant decrease in Fairness Perception comparing Discriminatory Low to Control Low. 
Furthermore, results support strong gender differences in fairness perception by treatment. Male 
Fairness Perception decreases in case of violations of distributive justice (Random) and further 
decreases in case of additional violations of procedural justice (Discriminatory), regardless of their 
own personal outcome. Fairness Perceptions by Female Participants on the other hand rather change 
dependent on the personal outcome of the individual subject with Fairness Perceptions dropping in 
case of facing a high tax rate. The drop in Fairness Perception by female participants more than doubles 
if they personally face a high tax rate while knowing that others are taxed at a low rate (Random High 
and Discriminatory High) as compared to universally applied tax rates. We will further analyze this 
link within the next section (Table 3 and Table 4). These results regarding gender differences in 
fairness evaluations are in line with Gilligan’s theory of women employing more relative and flexible 
fairness criteria. Furthermore evidence by Rodriguez-Lara (2015) regarding a dictator game with 
production suggests that women are indeed more sensitive towards their relative outcome position 
compared to their counterpart while men are not. During their experiment women’s choice of fair 
allocation was driven by what was most beneficial to themselves while men’s allocation decisions did 




4.1.2. Fairness Perceptions and Labor Supply 
 
 
Figure 5. Fairness Perception and Labor Supply (All participants) 
With respect to the hypothesized positive effect of perceived fairness on labor supply decisions 
(Hypothesis 2a), we first analyze differences in labor supply with respect to the integrated variable 
Fairness Perception of the experimental tax system. Figure 5 shows the average labor supply dependent 
on whether the tax system was perceived as Fair (Fairness Perception of 5 or higher) or not for all, 
male, and female participants separately. Regarding all participants we find a significant increase in 
labor supply if the tax system is perceived to be fair. Separating labor supply responses by male and 
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4.1.3. Treatment Effects on Labor Supply 
 
Figure 6. Disadvantageous vs. Preferential Treatments and Labor Supply 
While we are focusing on the effects of our violations of distributive and procedural justice on fairness 
perceptions and subsequently the relation between fairness perceptions and labor supply, we also want 
to analyze the direct effect our differing tax regimes (treatments Random and Discriminatory) on labor 
supply. We again start our evaluation by first comparing the combined treatment groups 
Disadvantageous Tax and Preferential Tax in order to be able to compare labor supply dependent on 
the outcome of inequality to participant’s personal advantage or disadvantage. Average labor supply 
in the case of Disadvantageous and Preferential Tax for all, male, and female participants are shown 
in Figure 6. Evaluations based on the combined treatments support the previously noted trends of 
differing fairness perceptions and differing labor supply responses by male and female participants. 
Male labor supply appears not to be driven by their own advantage but is rather steady within 
inequality. Female labor supply on the other hand sharply increases when female participants benefit 
















































Figure 7. Treatments and Labor Supply 
Results for average labor supply by all six treatments are shown in Figure 7. Individual labor supply 
is lower under discriminatory high taxation compared to universal high taxation. This difference is 
marginally significant based on the number of contracted tasks. Among those groups taxed at a low 
tax rate, average labor supply is the highest in the Discriminatory Low treatment. However, the 
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Figure 8. Treatments and Labor Supply for Male and Female Participants 
We further investigate labor supply reactions by male and female participants in each of the six 
treatments. Average labor supply by gender in each treatement is therefore shown in Figure 8. Again 
the data provides evidence of male and female participants strongly differing in their reactions towards 
inequalities in taxation. Several trends can be identified from the graph. When comparing the low tax 
treatments, male labor supply remains approximately steady despite the different determination 
procedures of the tax rate. Among the inequality treatments when male participants are taxed to their 
advantage, male labor supply shows a slight (statistically insignificant) decrease in the case of 
randomly applied tax rates and female discrimination. On the other hand, comparing the isolated effect 
of the tax rate on male labor supply (Control Low versus Control High), a strong increase in male labor 
supply in line with an income effect of taxation is visible. When comparing male reactions to the 
different violations of justice in the high tax treatments we find growing declines in male labor supply. 
Male labor supply is drastically lower when men face a high tax rate due to their gender 
(Discriminatory High) compared to a universally high tax rate (Control High).  
Labor supply by female participants on the other hand slightly increases in inequality when comparing 
the low tax treatments. Facing low tax rates due to random luck (Random Low) or due to male 
discrimination (Discriminatory Low), appears to motivate female subjects to work more. If 














































where the male labor force is discriminated, over and above the labor supply elasticity effect (see 
section 2). However, when drawing conclusions about optimal taxation caution is required. The strong 
reactions to a) changes in universally applied tax rates from low to high and b) inequality in the high 
tax treatments by male participants in our sample do neither support lower labor supply elasticities of 
men nor steady labor supply by men when switching from a universal tax system to one were men are 
discriminated. Finally, when comparing female labor supply reactions to the different inequality 
scenarios where female participants face a high tax rate, we also find evidence for a pronounced 
decrease in female labor supply in case of female discrimination. Overall, we cautiously interpret our 
results as negative labor supply effects of tax inequality creating for the disadvantaged party. Even 
more important, this result does not only hold if this party is female but the effect is even stronger if it 
is male.  
Overall our results regarding the effects of violations of distributive and procedural justice on labor 
supply have recently been confirmed by an independent experimental study regarding discriminatory 
wages. Gagnon et al. (2020) study the effect of randomly applied wages in comparison to gender 
discriminatory wage differences on labor supply by workers on an online labor platform. They also 
find a strong negative effect of gender discriminatory wages on labor supply of disadvantageously paid 
subjects. Parallel to our results randomly applied differential wages result in weaker declines of labor 
supply for low paid workers, while advantaged workers do not vary labor supply significantly. 
Furthermore their results show comparable gender differences in labor supply reactions. However, 
Gagnon et al. (2020) do not capture fairness perception regarding their experimental payment schemes, 
which limits comparability in that regard. We will analyse our  findings regarding treatment and gender 
effects on fairness perceptions as well as fairness effects on labor supply based on descriptive statistics 
further within the next section Multivariate Analysis. 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
We argue that our treatments affect the latent variable Fairness and that this variable as well as the tax 
rate can drive labor supply. In order to test our hypotheses, we construct a structural equation model 
using SmartPLS 3 (Ringle et al., 2015). We employ Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Modeling in order to estimate our latent variable Fairness and its subsequent effect on labor supply. 
Our model of the construct Fairness is a reflective measurement model including the four factor 
indicators General Fairness, Personal Fairness, Procedural Fairness and Equality. Results of our model 
estimation are shown in Table 2-Table 4. 
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First we evaluate our measurement model of Fairness.10 Based on common criteria, our construct of 
Fairness is reliable as both Cronbach’s Alpha (0.85) and Composite Reliability (0.90) are greater than 
0.7 with Composite Reliability below 0.95. Indicator reliability is also satisfied as all outer loadings 
are highly significant and greater than 0.708. Further, convergent validity is established as our 
construct of Fairness explains more than 50% of the underlying indicator variability (Average 
Variance Extracted equals 0.69). Finally, our construct of Fairness is distinct from all other constructs 
in the model (discriminant validity is achieved based evaluation of the Hetrotrait-Monotrait Ratio).11 
Table 2. Structural Equation Model (All participants) 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 Fairness Labor Supply  Labor Supply 
    Total Indirect Effects 
     
Discriminatory Tax -0.460***   -0.075* 
 (0.086)   (0.039) 
Random Tax -0.249***   -0.041* 
 (0.080)   (0.023) 
High Tax -0.272***   -0.044* 
 (0.072)   (0.025) 
High Tax  Discriminatory  -0.087   -0.014 
 (0.079)   (0.017) 
High Tax  Random -0.092   -0.015 
 (0.066)   (0.014) 
     
Fairness  0.162**   
  (0.080)   
High Tax  0.027   
  (0.076)   
Pre-Treatment Motivation  0.179***   
  (0.066)   
     
Observations 179 179  179 
R-Square 0.241 0.056   
R-Square Adjusted 0.219 0.040   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are based on Basic Bootstrapping of 1.000 sub-
samples. Confidence Interval Method: Bias-Corrected and Accelerated Bootstrap, Two Tailed Test.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results from the estimation of the structural model for all participants are shown in Table 2. Again, 
we find strong support of a negative effect of violations of distributive (Random Tax Rate) and 
procedural justice (Discriminatory Tax Rate) on fairness perceptions. Further, we find a highly 
                                                 
10  Evaluation based on untabulated results.  
11  Evaluation criteria following Hair et al., 2017.  
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significant negative effect of facing a high tax rate (High Tax) on Fairness, regardless of being treated 
unequally as compared to others. This effect is in line with findings based on descriptive statistics. 
Overall fairness ratings are lower on average for all high taxed subjects, especially in case of female 
subjects. Further, the strong baseline effect of a high tax rate is in line with stronger declines in fairness 
perceptions when personally facing a disadvantageous taxation as compared to a preferential taxation, 
an effect that again is more pronounced in case of female participants (see Figure 4). Also, the negative 
coefficients for the moderating effect of personally being taxed at a high rate when the tax system 
includes inequality (High Tax  Random and High Tax  Discriminatory), are in line with stronger 
declines in fairness perception when subjects are treated disadvantageously. However, moderating 
effects remain insignificant. Further, our results support the hypothesized positive effect of Fairness 
on labor supply (Hypothesis 2a). As participants showed great variation in their motivation to earn 
money during the experiment (Pre-Treatment Motivation), we control for this in our model of labor 
supply outcomes. We find subjects motivation to earn money during the experiment to have a highly 
significant, strong positive effect on their resulting labor supply decisions. We find marginally 
significant indirect effects of being taxed at a high rate (High Tax), facing violations of distributive 
justice (Random Tax) and facing violations of both distributive as well as procedural justice 
(Discriminatory Tax) on labor supply.   
In order to analyze previously discussed differences between fairness perceptions and resulting labor 
supply decisions by male and female participants, we estimate our model for male and female subjects 
separately. Table 3 and Table 4 show the respective results. First, regarding the measurement model, 
our construct of Fairness remains reliable and valid with respect to the above mentioned criteria.   
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Table 3. Structural Equation Model (Male participants) 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 Fairness Labor Supply  Labor Supply 
    Total Indirect Effects 
     
Discriminatory Tax -0.630***   -0.157** 
 (0.104)   (0.070) 
Random Tax -0.224**   -0.056 
 (0.110)   (0.038) 
High Tax -0.084   -0.021 
 (0.096)   (0.028) 
High Tax  Discriminatory  -0.026   -0.007 
 (0.099)   (0.028) 
High Tax  Random -0.019   -0.005 
 (0.094)   (0.026) 
     
Fairness  0.250**   
  (0.106)   
High Tax  0.111   
  (0.107)   
Pre-Treatment Motivation  0.239***   
  (0.089)   
     
Observations 82 82  82 
R-Square 0.320 0.140   
R-Square Adjusted 0.275 0.107   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are based on Basic Bootstrapping of 1.000 sub-
samples. Confidence Interval Method: Bias-Corrected and Accelerated Bootstrap, Two Tailed Test.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regarding the estimation results for male participants (Table 3), all results are in line with our findings 
based on descriptive statistics. We find a significant negative effect of violations of distributive justice 
(Random Tax) on fairness perception and a much stronger, highly significant effect of additional 
violations of procedural justice (Discriminatory Tax) on Fairness. Furthermore, personally facing a 
high tax rate has no significant effect on fairness perceptions by male participants.  The positive effect 
of Fairness on labor supply strengthens for male participants. With respect to indirect effects, we find 
evidence of a significant negative effect of facing a Discriminatory Tax on labor supply by male 
participants, while the indirect effects of facing mere violations of distributive justice (Random Tax) 
or a high tax rate (High Tax) on labor supply remain insignificant. These results further support that 
male subjects are especially sensitive towards violations of procedural justice.    
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Table 4. Structural Equation Model (Female participants) 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 Fairness Labor Supply  Labor Supply 
    Total Indirect Effects 
     
Discriminatory Tax -0.260*   -0.028 
 (0.135)   (0.039) 
Random Tax -0.230**   -0.025 
 (0.113)   (0.035) 
High Tax -0.465***   -0.051 
 (0.083)   (0.064) 
High Tax  Discriminatory  -0.165   -0.018 
 (0.099)   (0.030) 
High Tax  Random -0.129   -0.014 
 (0.086)   (0.023) 
     
Fairness  0.109   
  (0.133)   
High Tax  -0.035   
  (0.120)   
Pre-Treatment Motivation  0.144   
  (0.089)   
     
Observations 97 97  97 
R-Square 0.305 0.031   
R-Square Adjusted 0.267 0.000   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are based on Basic Bootstrapping of 1.000 sub-
samples. Confidence Interval Method: Bias-Corrected and Accelerated Bootstrap, Two Tailed Test.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regarding the estimation results for female participants (Table 4), again all results are in line with our 
findings based on descriptive statistics. Fairness perception by female subjects is strongly influenced 
by them personally facing a high tax rate. Fairness perception by female participants appears to be 
driven by distributive justice and moreover there personal outcome, with the effect of random taxation 
and discriminatory taxation nearly being equal in size. Also, only the effect of facing pure violations 
of distributive justice has a significant effect on fairness perceptions by female participants. In line 
with our analysis of descriptive statistics, we also do not find Fairness to have a significant effect on 
labor supply for female participants. Further, none of the indirect effects on labor supply are significant 
regarding female participants.  
Taken together, the separate analysis of male and female participants offers strong support for gender 
driven differences in both perceptions of justice violations as well as the reaction towards these. 
Fairness perceptions in reaction to violations of distributive and procedural justice of taxation as well 
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as labor supply responses with respect to fairness differ greatly between male and female participants.  
4.3. Robustness and Discussion 
Despite the strong prior evidence on gender differences in preferences and decision making, we test 
whether our results might be driven by any other participant characteristic than mere being male or 
female. First, we find some further differences in personal characteristics of male and female 
participants. Women in the sample are significantly younger and study in lower semesters than male 
participants. A higher proportion of the male participants is studying at the School of Business & 
Economics. Women in the sample also have less job experience, less disposable income and are more 
interested in politics. They also state to have lower Tax Expertise. Nevertheless, regarding each of 
these characteristics we do not find a significant influence of any of the characteristics on any of our 
measures of labor supply or fairness perception. We also fail at finding the same differences in fairness 
perception and labor supply for gender to be present when dividing the sample by any other 
characteristic. Here we put a special focus on two alternative explanations, namely differences in 
preferences for equality and experiences regarding prior discrimination. With respect to preferences 
for equality, the distribution within the sample contradicts our findings with female participants 
actually being slightly more aheadness averse than male participants. As aheadness aversion should 
increase perceived unfairness of advantageous inequality this finding would rather weaken our results 
than causing them. With respect to prior experiences of discrimination, we do find that women in our 
sample have a lot more experience with gender discrimination. Nevertheless, these women rather 
accept inequality due to violations of justice more easily and show less deviation in their fairness 
perception according to their personal outcome. Again, prior discrimination appears to have weakened 
rather than caused our results. Furthermore, including additional control variables into our analysis 
does not change our results.  
In order to ensure that our results are robust towards the estimation procedure applied in the 
multivariate analysis, we replicate our structural equation model using simple Tobit regression models. 
Results are shown in Appendix 3 (Table 5-Table 7) and Appendix 4 (Table 8-Table 10). In addition to 
regarding fairness perception based on our integrated measure Fairness Perception (simple mean of 
General Fairness, Personal Fairness, Procedural Fairness and Equality), we hereby also test treatment 
effects on the distinct domains of fairness perception. Regarding results for all participants we can 
confirm a highly significant negative effect of discriminatory tax rates on our simple mean measure of 
Fairness Perception, as well as all single fairness categories despite Personal Fairness. Random 
taxation, however, has only a marginally significant negative effect on General Fairness and Equality. 
Based on regression results the effect of facing a high tax rate and the additional effect of facing a high 
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tax rate due to discrimination appears to be driving perceptions of Personal Fairness.  
Results for male participants regarding treatment effects on fairness perception, strongly confirm that 
male fairness perception is negatively affected by discrimination in taxation. Therefore, we can 
conclude that male fairness perception is especially sensitive to violations of procedural justice, with 
no bias based on the individual outcome. However, female fairness perception is rather responsive in 
the domain of Personal Fairness, with Personal Fairness being driven by the personal outcome of 
facing a high tax rate. Again these results support strong differences in Gender specific reactions 
towards violations of justice.  
Regarding the effect of fairness perception on labor supply, we find a significant positive effect of all 
fairness measures except of procedural fairness on when considering the whole sample. Results for 
male participants confirm that primarily men show positive labor supply reactions towards perceived 
fairness of the tax system. However, most interestingly, male participants do not show significant 
positive labor supply reactions in response to perceived Personal Fairness, while the single category 
analysis reveals that female labor supply appears to be driven by Personal Fairness.  
Overall, our robustness tests confirm our findings, especially with regard to strong gender differences 
in fairness perception of violations of distributive and procedural justice. While the lack of significant 
effects of fairness on labor supply of women might be considered good news regarding existing 
inequalities in taxation, such as negative incentives for secondary earners, one has to be cautious in 
jumping to conclusions. First, the additional analysis indicates that female labor supply does react 
towards perceived Personal Fairness, which again is negatively affected by women personally facing 
high taxes and even declines further when others are facing lower tax burdens. Second, male reactions 
towards these inequalities potentially lead to welfare losses due to decreasing labor supply by the male 
workforce when the tax system violates procedural justice. And, at last, the implementation of gender-
based taxation in order to increase female labor market participation is very likely to also lead to strong 
negative effects in male labor supply based on our results.  
5. Conclusion  
We discuss the effect of violations of distributive and procedural justice in taxation on fairness 
perception and labor supply. By manipulating the fairness of both the outcome of taxation as well as 
the determination procedure in a controlled laboratory experiment, we provide evidence of a strong 
negative effect of random and discriminatory taxation on fairness perception.  
We further provide evidence of strong gender differences in fairness perception regarding distributive 
and procedural justice. While male fairness perception is especially sensitive towards violations of 
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procedural justice, female participants rather change their fairness perception based on their own 
outcome of the tax allocation procedure.  
Regarding labor supply changes in reaction to perceived fairness of the tax system, again, male and 
female participants do not appear to be on the same side. While we do provide evidence of a strong 
positive effect of perceived fairness on labor supply regarding our whole labor market population, the 
separate analysis of male and female reactions reveals that only men show significant positive 
reactions towards perceived fairness. Labor supply by female participants on the other hand cannot be 
explained with fairness perceptions.  
Taken together, we can conclude that our male participants considered both outcome inequality as well 
as procedural unfairness as unfair, independent of being on the winning or losing side, and adjusted 
their labor supply according to their fairness perceptions. On the contrary, our female participants 
based their fairness perceptions more on their personal outcome and did not adjust their labor supply 
according to their fairness perceptions.  
These findings have important implications for both existing inequalities within tax policies as well as 
potential reforms towards gender-based taxation in order to increase female labor market participation. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to identify the existing gender difference in both fairness 
perception and resulting consequences in real decisions with regard to tax outcome equality and 
procedural justice. Being aware of potential shortcomings of the presented results due to the small 
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Appendix 1. Treatment information 
Treatment information Control Low 
Information about the offered employment contract 
At this point, you have the possibility to determine the favored amount of work you want to carry out. 
The employment contract refers to the number of tables you have to work on. You can determine the 
number of tables in a range from 0 (rejection of the labor contract) to 200 (maximum work effort). The 
payment depends on the number of correctly counted tables. You receive a gross salary of 15 cents per 
correctly processed table, which corresponds to an expected hourly gross salary of about 13 Euros on 
average.  
The gross salary is subject to a general tax rate of 20%. The obtained tax contributions will be 
refunded to the community by donating them to the library of the School of Business & Economics. 
Note: If you work on less tables than contractually agreed upon, you violate your employment contract, 
which leads to the total cancellation of your payment. In this case, you will only receive the fixed show 
up fee of 3 Euros. Accordingly, the tax payment will equal 0 Euros. 
Please decide now how many tables you want to process and type the corresponding number in the 
provided field below. Begin your task by clicking on „Start Working Period“. 
Number of tables that you want to process: 
 
Treatment information Control High 
Information about the offered employment contract 
At this point, you have the possibility to determine the favored amount of work you want to carry out. 
The employment contract refers to the number of tables you have to work on. You can determine the 
number of tables in a range from 0 (rejection of the labor contract) to 200 (maximum work effort). The 
payment depends on the number of correctly counted tables. You receive a gross salary of 15 cents per 
correctly processed table, which corresponds to an expected hourly gross salary of about 13 Euros on 
average.  
The gross salary is subject to a general tax rate of 40%. The obtained tax contributions will be 
refunded to the community by donating them to the library of the School of Business & Economics. 
Note: If you work on less tables than contractually agreed upon, you violate your employment contract, 
which leads to the total cancellation of your payment. In this case, you will only receive the fixed show 
up fee of 3 Euros. Accordingly, the tax payment will equal 0 Euros. 
Please decide now how many tables you want to process and type the corresponding number in the 
provided field below. Begin your task by clicking on „Start Working Period“. 
Number of tables that you want to process: 
  
Treatment information Random Low and Random High 
Information about the offered employment contract 
At this point, you have the possibility to determine the favored amount of work you want to carry out. 
The employment contract refers to the number of tables you have to work on. You can determine the 
number of tables in a range from 0 (rejection of the labor contract) to 200 (maximum work effort). The 
payment depends on the number of correctly counted tables. You receive a gross salary of 15 cents per 
correctly processed table, which corresponds to an expected hourly gross salary of about 13 Euros on 
average.   
The gross salary is liable for taxation. The applicable tax rate depends on the color of the table tennis 
ball which you drew at the beginning of the experiment. The applicable tax rate is 20% for 
participants with an orange ball and 40% for participants with a white ball. The obtained tax 
contributions will be refunded to the community by donating them to the library of the School of 
Business & Economics.  
Note: If you work on less tables than contractually agreed upon, you violate your employment contract, 
which leads to the total cancellation of your payment. In this case, you will only receive the fixed show 
up fee of 3 Euros. Accordingly, the tax payment will equal 0 Euros. 
Please decide now how many tables you want to process and type the corresponding number in the 
provided field below. Begin your task by clicking on „Start Working Period“. 
Number of tables that you want to process: 
  
  
Treatment information Discriminatory Low and Discriminatory High (female discrimination) 
Information about the offered employment contract 
At this point, you have the possibility to determine the favored amount of work you want to carry out. 
The employment contract refers to the number of tables you have to work on. You can determine the 
number of tables in a range from 0 (rejection of the labor contract) to 200 (maximum work effort). The 
payment depends on the number of correctly counted tables. You receive a gross salary of 15 cents per 
correctly processed table, which corresponds to an expected hourly gross salary of about 13 Euros on 
average.   
The gross salary is liable for taxation. The applicable tax rate depends on your gender. The applicable 
tax rate is 20% for male and 40% for female participants. The obtained tax contributions will be 
refunded to the community by donating them to the library of the School of Business & Economics.   
Note: If you work on less tables than contractually agreed upon, you violate your employment contract, 
which leads to the total cancellation of your payment. In this case, you will only receive the fixed show 
up fee of 3 Euros. Accordingly, the tax payment will equal 0 Euros. 
Please decide now how many tables you want to process and type the corresponding number in the 
provided field below. Begin your task by clicking on „Start Working Period“. 
Number of tables that you want to process: 
 
Treatment information Discriminatory Low and Discriminatory High (male discrimination) 
Information about the offered employment contract 
At this point, you have the possibility to determine the favored amount of work you want to carry out. 
The employment contract refers to the number of tables you have to work on. You can determine the 
number of tables in a range from 0 (rejection of the labor contract) to 200 (maximum work effort). The 
payment depends on the number of correctly counted tables. You receive a gross salary of 15 cents per 
correctly processed table, which corresponds to an expected hourly gross salary of about 13 Euros on 
average.   
The gross salary is liable for taxation. The applicable tax rate depends on your gender. The applicable 
tax rate is 20% for female and 40% for male participants. The obtained tax contributions will be 
refunded to the community by donating them to the library of the School of Business & Economics.   
Note: If you work on less tables than contractually agreed upon, you violate your employment contract, 
which leads to the total cancellation of your payment. In this case, you will only receive the fixed show 
up fee of 3 Euros. Accordingly, the tax payment will equal 0 Euros. 
Please decide now how many tables you want to process and type the corresponding number in the 
provided field below. Begin your task by clicking on „Start Working Period“. 




Appendix 2. Variable description 
Variable Description 
Labor Supply Number of tasks entered in the labor contract 
  
High Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject is taxed at the high rate (40%) 
Random Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject is in either Random Low or 
Random High treatment 
Discriminatory Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject is in either Discriminatory Low 
or Discriminatory High treatment 
High Tax  Random Interaction variable of High Tax and Random 
High Tax  
Discriminatory 
Interaction variable of High Tax and Discriminatory 
General Fairness Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “The 
tax system applied in the experiment was fair in general” 
Personal Fairness Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “The 
tax system applied in the experiment was fair for me personal” 
Procedural Fairness Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “The 
rules applied to determine the applied tax rate in the experiment were 
fair” 
Equality Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “All 
taxpayers were treated equally by the experimental tax authorities” 
Fairness Perception Simple mean of the values of General Fairness, Personal Fairness, 
Procedural Fairness and Equality by subject 
Fair  Dummy variable equal to 1 if  the value of Fairness Perception is 5 
or higher 
Fairness Latent variable of fairness perception in structural equation model. 
Reflective measurement based on the factor indicators General 
Fairness, Personal Fairness, Procedural Fairness and Equality 
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant is female 
Labor Time Time spent working on the tasks in minutes 
Aheadnessaverse Dummy variable equal to one if subject chooses egalitarian outcomes 
rather than being ahead 
Behindnessaverse Dummy variable equal to one if subject chooses egalitarian outcome 
rather than being behind 
Egalitarian Dummy variable equal to one if subject chooses egalitarian outcome 
over being ahead or behind 
Experienced 
Discrimination 
Dummy variable equal to one if participant has been discriminated in 
his private and/or professional live any time prior to the experiment 
  
  
Appendix 3. Treatment effects on Fairness Perception 
Table 5. Fairness Perception by Treatments (All participants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fairness General Personal Procedural Equality 
 Perception Fairness Fairness Fairness  
      
Discriminatory Tax -1.462*** -2.011*** -0.521 -2.192*** -3.789*** 
 (0.443) (0.652) (0.632) (0.739) (1.031) 
Random Tax -0.584 -1.089* 0.522 -0.861 -1.813* 
 (0.452) (0.658) (0.645) (0.743) (1.007) 
High Tax -0.492 -0.814 -1.370** -0.763 0.707 
 (0.450) (0.649) (0.641) (0.733) (0.991) 
High Tax  Discriminatory  -1.003 -0.843 -2.231** -0.159 -1.649 
 (0.645) (0.953) (0.942) (1.061) (1.466) 
High Tax  Random -0.742 -0.233 -1.246 -0.017 -2.790* 
 (0.638) (0.928) (0.916) (1.044) (1.438) 
Constant 4.546*** 4.429*** 4.771*** 4.638*** 4.717*** 
 (0.311) (0.447) (0.441) (0.509) (0.688) 
      
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0712 0.0481 0.0765 0.0302 0.0677 
Note: All estimations are Tobit regression models censored at one and seven. Standard errors in 




Table 6. Fairness Perception by Treatments (Male Participants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fairness General Personal Procedural Equality 
 Perception Fairness Fairness Fairness  
      
Discriminatory Tax -2.305*** -3.620*** -1.836** -3.269*** -5.484*** 
 (0.588) (0.994) (0.869) (1.071) (1.655) 
Random Tax -0.843 -1.200 -0.148 -1.357 -2.460 
 (0.620) (1.001) (0.918) (1.097) (1.604) 
High Tax -0.232 -0.292 -0.926 -0.692 0.886 
 (0.618) (0.984) (0.911) (1.067) (1.539) 
High Tax  Discriminatory  -0.571 -0.201 -1.906 0.518 0.154 
 (0.872) (1.444) (1.317) (1.543) (2.248) 
High Tax  Random -0.033 -0.083 1.174 0.909 -2.982 
 (0.938) (1.510) (1.391) (1.640) (2.440) 
Constant 4.385*** 4.350*** 4.858*** 4.114*** 4.646*** 
 (0.424) (0.677) (0.628) (0.736) (1.063) 
      
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0079 0.0002 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1042 0.0821 0.0929 0.0511 0.0861 
Note: All estimations are Tobit regression models censored at one and seven. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
Table 7. Fairness Perception by Treatments (Female Participants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fairness General Personal Procedural Equality 
 Perception Fairness Fairness Fairness  
      
Discriminatory Tax -0.387 -0.347 1.012 -0.934 -2.195* 
 (0.611) (0.816) (0.806) (0.962) (1.319) 
Random Tax -0.361 -0.999 1.065 -0.492 -1.379 
 (0.596) (0.800) (0.783) (0.937) (1.262) 
High Tax -0.721 -1.251 -1.719** -0.815 0.512 
 (0.593) (0.792) (0.777) (0.931) (1.260) 
High Tax  Discriminatory  -1.639* -1.597 -2.701** -0.983 -3.310* 
 (0.869) (1.179) (1.169) (1.364) (1.919) 
High Tax  Random -1.103 -0.111 -2.265** -0.741 -2.774 
 (0.816) (1.095) (1.083) (1.278) (1.753) 
Constant 4.687*** 4.500*** 4.688*** 5.089*** 4.815*** 
 (0.413) (0.547) (0.534) (0.651) (0.880) 
      
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0402 0.0002 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0828 0.0540 0.1275 0.0296 0.0660 
Note: All estimations are Tobit regression models censored at one and seven. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
Appendix 4. Effects of Fairness Perception on Labor Supply  
Table 8. Labor Supply and Fairness Perception 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply 
      
Fairness Perception 6.870**     
 (3.082)     
General Fairness  5.873**    
  (2.700)    
Personal Fairness   5.859**   
   (2.769)   
Procedural Fairness    3.443  
    (2.529)  
Equality     3.896* 
     (2.248) 
High Tax 3.535 2.306 8.068 -0.590 -1.184 
 (10.372) (10.257) (11.190) (10.191) (10.098) 
Pre-Treatment Motivation 8.056** 7.941** 8.432*** 7.930** 7.896** 
 (3.094) (3.094) (3.103) (3.117) (3.110) 
Constant 24.728 30.699 22.191 38.780** 38.752** 
 (20.652) (19.317) (21.790) (19.345) (18.393) 
      
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 
Prob > chi2 0.0101 0.0113 0.0127 0.0413 0.0246 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0063 0.0061 0.0060 0.0046 0.0052 
Note: All estimations are Tobit regression models censored at zero and 200. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
Table 9. Labor Supply and Fairness Perception (Male Participants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply 
      
Fairness Perception 11.742**     
 (4.987)     
General Fairness  9.196**    
  (4.173)    
Personal Fairness   3.698   
   (4.184)   
Procedural Fairness    8.715**  
    (4.254)  
Equality     8.455** 
     (3.619) 
High Tax 18.157 16.264 18.866 16.908 13.242 
 (16.227) (16.272) (17.124) (16.332) (16.227) 
Pre-Treatment Motivation 12.501** 12.721** 13.564*** 12.399** 12.732** 
 (4.858) (4.878) (4.978) (4.909) (4.859) 
Constant -2.267 7.245 16.227 10.047 10.908 
 (29.491) (28.107) (31.284) (27.949) (27.245) 
      
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 
Prob > chi2 0.0037 0.0050 0.0314 0.0067 0.0038 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0169 0.0161 0.0111 0.0153 0.0168 
Note: All estimations are Tobit regression models censored at zero and 200. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
Table 10. Labor Supply and Fairness Perception (Female Participants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply Labor Supply 
      
Fairness Perception 3.349     
 (3.925)     
General Fairness  2.421    
  (3.541)    
Personal Fairness   7.627**   
   (3.803)   
Procedural Fairness    1.308  
    (3.148)  
Equality     0.238 
     (2.745) 
High Tax -6.072 -7.419 8.186 -9.599 -10.625 
 (13.284) (13.057) (15.175) (12.446) (12.317) 
Pre-Treatment Motivation 5.312 5.094 6.242 5.089 4.884 
 (3.887) (3.869) (3.852) (3.899) (3.871) 
Constant 43.329 49.216* 14.410 53.268* 59.192** 
 (28.851) (26.465) (30.785) (26.879) (24.151) 
      
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 
Prob > chi2 0.4112 0.4548 0.1063 0.5084 0.5406 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0029 0.0026 0.0061 0.0023 0.0022 
Note: All estimations are Tobit regression models censored at zero and 200. Standard errors in 





Participant characteristics  
      
 N Mean Sd Min Max 
Gender 179 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Talent 179 -55.07 27.79 -220.7382 0 
Age 179 21.79 4.29 17 52 
Business & Economics 179 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Semester 179 3.77 3.83 1 25 
Religiosity 179 3.65 2.57 1 10 
Disposable Income 179 395.04 259.97 0 1600 
Time Pressure 179 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Political Orientation 179 4.44 1.62 2 10 
Political Interest 179 2.18 0.75 1 4 
Pre-Treatment Motivation 179 4.99 1.62 1 7 
Job Experience 179 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Tax Expertise 179 2.72 1.47 1 7 
Optimism 1 179 5.92 1.15 2 7 
Optimism 2 179 5.78 1.42 1 7 
Aheadness Aversion 1 179 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Aheadness Aversion 2 179 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Behindness Aversion 1 179 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Behindness Aversion 2 179 0.71 0.46 0 1 





Labor Supply Number of tasks entered in the labor contract 
High Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject is taxed at the high rate (40%) 
Random Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject is in either Random Low or 
Random High treatment 
Discriminatory Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject is in either Discriminatory 
Low or Discriminatory High treatment 
High Tax  Random Interaction variable of High Tax and Random 
High Tax  
Discriminatory 
Interaction variable of High Tax and Discriminatory 
General Fairness Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “The 
tax system applied in the experiment was fair in general” 
Personal Fairness Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “The 
tax system applied in the experiment was fair for me personal” 
Procedural Fairness Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “The 
rules applied to determine the applied tax rate in the experiment 
were fair” 
Equality Fairness rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “All 
taxpayers were treated equally by the experimental tax authorities” 
Fairness Perception Simple mean of the values of General Fairness, Personal Fairness, 
Procedural Fairness and Equality by subject 
Fair  Dummy variable equal to 1 if  the value of Fairness Perception is 5 
or higher 
Fairness Latent variable of fairness perception in structural equation model. 
Reflective measurement based on the factor indicators General 
Fairness, Personal Fairness, Procedural Fairness and Equality 
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant is female 
Labor Time Time spent working on the tasks in minutes 
Aheadnessaverse Dummy variable equal to one if both aheadness aversion 1 and 
aheadness aversion 2 are equal to one 
Behindnessaverse Dummy variable equal to one if both behindness aversion 1 and 
behindness aversion 2 are equal to one 
Egalitarian Dummy variable equal to one if all aheadness aversion 1 and 2 and 
behindness aversion 1 and 2 are equal to one 
Experienced 
Discrimination 
Dummy variable equal to one if participant has been discriminated 





Motivation to earn money during the experiment: Rating on a scale 
from 1 to 7 ranging from “hardly motivated” to “highly motivated” 
in the pre-experimental questionnaire 
 
Change in Motivation Change in the motivation to earn money during the experiment due 
to the labor contract conditions: Rating on a scale from 1 to 7 




Level of Motivation to earn money during the experiment 
calculated as Pre-Treatment Motivation -/+ Change in Motivation 
Talent Mean time per table in the training period multiplied by minus one 
Age Age in years  
Business & 
Economics 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant studies at the School of 
Business & Economics 
Semester Number of terms the participant is currently studying in 
Religiosity Rating on a scale from 1 to 10 ranging from “not religious at all” to 
“very religious” 
Political Orientation Rating on a scale from 1 to 10 ranging from “left” to “right” 
Political Interest Rating on a scale from 1 to 4 ranging from “strongly interested” to 
“not interested at all” 
Job Experience Dummy variable equal to one if participant has experience working 
in a real job 
Tax Expertise Rating on scale from 1 to 7 ranging from “very bad (no tax 
knowledge at all)” to “very good (tax expert)” 
Disposable Income Monthly disposable income after rent and fix expenditures in Euro  
Time Pressure Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant stated that he/she has been 
under time pressure and had a following appointment 
Optimism 1 Rating on a scale from 1 to 7 concerning the statement “I always try 
to make the best of the situation” 
Optimism 2 Rating on a scale from 1 to 7 ranging from “half empty” to “half 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant chose equal payment 
distribution  (10:10 versus 10:6) 
Aheadness  
Aversion 2 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant chose equal payment 
distribution (10:10 versus 16:4) 
Behindness  
Aversion 1 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant chose equal payment 
distribution (10:10 versus 10:18) 
Behindness  
Aversion 2 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant chose equal payment 
distribution (10:10 versus 11:19) 
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